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I
INTRODUCTION
In most endeavors concerned with the acquisition of knowledge, quantitative
information is welcomed. In law, however, it appears sometimes that scientific or
numerical evidence makes cases harder, not easier. Nevertheless, there are many
cases and administrative proceedings, in such areas as environmental law, food
and drug regulation, and civil rights, in which statistical data obtained by observa-
tion or experiment are readily accepted as assisting in the proper resolution of
disputed issues of fact.' When courts or administrators confront scientific and
statistical evidence in these proceedings, they are not always certain of how to
weigh the evidence or whether they should, or must, rely on the standards for
proof that scientists apply in evaluating statistical hypotheses.
Two decisions of the Supreme Court illustrate this uncertainty. In Caslaneda v.
Parida, 2 a grand jury discrimination case, the Court, acting as its own statistician,
computed a statistic known as the "standard deviation."' 3 The Court found this
computation highly probative of discrimination in light of the "general rule" that
"if the difference between the expected value and the observed number is greater
than two or three standard deviations, the hypothesis that the jury drawing was
random would be suspect to a social scientist." '4 One would not have thought that
this reference, in a single footnote, to a standard of proof popular among social
scientists would be read as commanding that the same standard be determinative
when evaluating statistical evidence in court. Yet, in Hazelwood School District v.
United States, 5 an employment discrimination case decided the same year, the
Court dropped the qualifying language about social science and noted that, under
the "precise" methodology delineated in Castaneda, a disparity of slightly less than
two standard deviations was not "suspect." 6 In the wake of these opinions,
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2. 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
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litigants in discrimination cases undertake intensive searches for numbers that can
be translated into standard deviations, and plaintiffs have come to treasure dis-
crepancies that amount to at least two, and preferably three, of these standard
deviations. 7
This quest for "statistical significance" is not confined to discrimination cases.
In any case involving statistical proof, the proponent of the evidence understand-
ably covets testimony that the data is "significant." Although there are grounds to
question whether such testimony as to "significance" should even be admissible,8
this article confines attention to one issue-the relationship between the putative
scientific standard of proof and the legal standards of proof. Section II describes
these legal standards, first in the conventional language of the law and then in the
terminology of statistical decision theory. Section III describes the technical con-
cept of statistical significance and shows the impossibility, in general, of equating
statistical significance with legally satisfactory proof. What follows from this anal-
ysis is, I hope, the beginning of a clearer understanding of how statistical methods
for measuring the probative force of data can help the trier of fact decide whether
the proponent of the data has fulfilled the appropriate burden of persuasion. 9
II
THE LEGAL STANDARDS OF PROOF
A. The Legal Formulas
Witnesses testify. Lawyers argue. Courts decide. With these rituals, many
things are accomplished.' 0 In part, all the participants contribute in an effort to
reconstruct the past. Yet, the success of such efforts rarely can be known. In any
seriously disputed case, some uncertainty remains. Even so, a verdict must be
returned, and this verdict may have immediate and dramatic consequences for the
ebb and flow of money and for the activities, if not the very lives, of persons or
organizations.
Analysts and Proof of Employment Dzscrmznatzon, 1981 U. ILL. L.F. 33, 52-53; Kaye, Book Review, 80 MICH. L.
REV. 833, 838-41 (1982) (reviewing D. BALDUS & J. COLE, STATISTICAL PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION
(1980)).
7. In the employment discrimination field, cases involving expert testimony structured to replicate the
"standard deviation analysis" of Castaneda and Hazelwood are becoming legion, so much so that the failure
to pursue this analysis leads some courts to discredit the statistical evidence. See, e.g., Hill v. K-Mart Corp.,
699 F.2d 776, 780 n.7 (5th Cir. 1983). All too often, conclusory statements as to whether the number of
standard deviations exceed two or three are given greater weight than the number itself. See, e.g., id;
EEOC v. H.S. Camp & Sons, Inc. 29 Empl. Prac. Dec. 1 32,930, at 26,369 (M.D. Fla. 1982) ("an average
statistical disparity of 1.39 standard deviations" held to be "far below the standard deviation level that has
been established as constituting a gross statistical disparity," and an "average statistical disparity of only
2.87 standard deviations" dismissed as falling below this level). For additional citations, see D. BALDUS &
J. COLE, STATISTICAL PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION (1980); W. CONNOLLY & D. PETERSON, USE OF STA-
TISTICS IN EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY LITIGATION (1980).
8. I am preparing a more comprehensive analysis of hypothesis and significance testing that develops
such an argument.
9. The forthcoming paper mentioned in note 8 offers some suggestions as to how the procedures used
in hypothesis testing might be adapted to improve legal factfinding.
10. See, e.g., Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Preciston and Ritlual in the Legal Process, 84 HAR%;. L. R-v. 1329
(1971).
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To facilitate and structure these decisions, and to cope with the factual uncer-
tainty that remains after witnesses testify and lawyers argue, the law of evidence
imposes on one or another party a component of the burden of proof known as the
"burden of persuasion." ' l For example, in a murder case the prosecution must
prove "beyond a reasonable doubt" that the defendant did in fact take the life of
another human being. In different types of cases, a different showing may be
required to "carry" the burden of proof. 12 Thus, in most civil litigation a mere
"preponderance of the evidence" suffices. In some civil cases, however, a more
stringent standard will be applied. In these "quasi-criminal" matters, one must
adduce "clear and convincing" or "clear, convincing, and unequivocal" proof.13
The courts recognize that these varying burdens of persuasion reflect the
11. The burden of proof usually is said to involve two components - the burden of production and
the burden of persuasion. See J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON
LAW 355-59 (1898); James, Burdens of Proof 47 U. VA. L. REV. 51 (1961). Plaintiffs and prosecutors gener-
ally have the burden of proving all the factual elements essential to their case under the applicable substan-
tive law. In a prosecution for murder, for instance, the state must prove (among other things) that the
defendant took the life of another human being. In a product liability action involving, for example, a
runaway tractor-type lawnmower that allegedly chewed its way into a neighbor's house, the plaintiff must
prove (among other things) that the exuberant mower was defective. This burden of proof compels the
party to come forward with evidence sufficient to convince the judge that a reasonable jury could conclude,
on the strength of this evidence, that the requisite facts have been established. This is the burden of
production, also known as the "burden of evidence," 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 103 (1964), and the "duty of
going forward." J. THAYER, supra, at 355. If the party with the burden fails to establish a prima facie case
because the evidence is inadequate to permit a reasonable person to believe that the requisite facts exist,
then the judge should direct a verdict and not permit the burden of production to shift to the defendant.
See, e.g., Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981) (plaintiffis prima facie
case of disparate treatment shifts the burden of production to the defendant and "[i]f the trier of fact
believes the plaintiff's evidence, and if the employer is silent . . . the court must enter judgment for the
plaintiff .... "). Placing the burden of proof on one party means that this party must do more than
introduce a bare minimum of evidence. He must convince the jury of the fact in dispute. The burden of
persuasion specifies how convincing his evidence must be. See McNaughton, Burden of Production of Evidence:
A Function of the Burden of Persuasion, 68 HARv. L. REV. 1382 (1955). Wigmore used the phrase the "risk of
nonpersuasion." 9 J. WIGIORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2485 (1940); see also Winter,
The Jury andthe Risk of Nonpersuasion, 5 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 335 (1971).
12. But see Underwood, The Thumb on the Scales ofJustice: Burdens of Persuasion in Crriinal Cases. 86 YALE
L.J. 1299, 1300 n.4 (1977):
The metaphor of carrying burdens is confusing for two reasons. First, it suggests, inaccurately, that
the law is concerned with the extent of a party's labors, when in fact the evidence that satisfies the
burden may be introduced by either party. Second, it seems implausible to tell the factfinder to reach
a decision, attach a probability estimate to that decision, and then use a legal rule about burdens to
translate the decision into a verdict, sometimes translating a decision forA into a verdict for B. Once
he has decided, it seems odd to use a rule to tell him to change his decision. It is more sensible, and
truer to the purpose of the rule, to tell him not to decide when he cannot be sure enough, and then to
provide a legal rule to make the decision for him in such cases.
This article takes a somewhat different view of what is "sensible." Rather than distinguishing between
"decisions" and "verdicts" and treating the burden of persuasion as a direction to the factfinder to "regard
the dispute as too close for decision," Underwood, supra, at 1300, this article interprets the rule as telling
factfinders how they should translate probability estimates into decisions. I do not imply, however, that
jurors actually decide cases by making subjective probability statements, then converting them into ver-
dicts. Statistical decision theory and signal detection theory (of which Professor Underwood, supra, at 1331
n.93, seems to approve) are introduced in Section B solely to provide a heuristic or normative model of
what the burden of persuasion should mean if it is to further certain goals. See Kaye, Probabiy Theory Meets
Res Ipsa Loquitur 77 MICH. L. REV. 1456 (1979); Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 MICii. L. REV. 1021
(1977).
13. See C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAWS OF EVIDENCE §§ 340-341 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972).
The phrase "quasi-criminal" appears in Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424 (1979).
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relative costs of erroneous verdicts. In Speiser v. Randall, 14 the Supreme Court held
that a state property tax exemption conditioned on a loyalty oath unconstitution-
ally imposed a burden on claimants to prove their loyalty. In dictum, Justice
Brennan, writing for the majority, explained that:
"[t]here is always in litigation a margin of error, representing error in factfinding which
both parties must take into account. Where one party has at stake an interest of tran-
scending value - as a criminal defendant his liberty - this margin of error is reduced as to
him by the process of placing on the other party the burden of . . . persuading the
factfinder at the conclusion of the trial of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
15
In other words, the "interest of transcending value"-the liberty of the person-
makes the cost of an erroneous verdict for the state greater than the cost of an
erroneous verdict for the defendant and underlies the requirement of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt in criminal cases.
In addressing the constitutional foundations of the beyond a reasonable doubt
requirement as applied to a juvenile delinquency proceeding, Justice Harlan elab-
orated on this theme in his concurring opinion in In re Winship. 16 Harlan wrote:
In a lawsuit between two parties, a factual error can make a difference in one of two ways.
First, it can result in a judgment in favor of the plaintiff when the true facts warrant a
judgment for the defendant. The analogue in a criminal case would be the conviction of an
innocent man. On the other hand, an erroneous factual determination can result in a judg-
ment for the defendant when the true facts justify a judgment in plaintiff's favor. The
criminal analogue would be the acquittal of a guilty man.
1 7
He explicitly reasoned that the appropriate burden of persuasion should turn on
the relative seriousness of the possible errors:
The standard of proof influences the relative frequency of these two types of erroneous
outcomes. If, for example, the standard of proof for a criminal trial were a preponderance
of the evidence rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt, there would be a smaller risk
of factual errors that result in freeing guilty persons, but a far greater risk of factual errors
that result in convicting the innocent. Because the standard of proof affects the comparative
frequency of these two types of erroneous outcomes, the choice of the standard to be applied
in a particular kind of litigation should, in a rational world, reflect an assessment of the
comparative social disutility of each. 18
The Justice illustrated the relationship between the "comparative social disutility"
and the burden of persuasion by considering the preponderance of the evidence
standard:
In a civil suit between two private parties for money damages, for example, we view it as no
more serous in general for there to be an erroneous verdict in the defendant's favor than for
there to be an erroneous verdict in the plaintiffs favor. A preponderance of the evidence
standard therefore seems peculiarly appropriate for, as explained most sensibly, it simply
14. 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
15. Id. at 525-26 (dictum).
16. 397 U.S. 358 (1970). Wthshzpo held the reasonable doubt standard constitutionally mandated in an
adjudication of delinquency based on conduct that would constitute a crime for an adult. Id at 368. Only
Mr. Justice Black questioned the constitutional basis for the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt in a criminal trial of an adult. Id at 377 (Black, J., dissenting). The majority was of the opinion
that the "Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reason-
able doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged." Id. at 364.
17. d. at 370-71 (Harlan, J., concurring).
18. Id at 371.
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requires the trier of fact 'to believe that the existence of a fact is more probable than its
nonexistence .... 19
The Court has had occasion to advert to Justice Harlan's "comparative social
disutility" analysis in several recent cases. For example, in holding that due pro-
cess demands at least proof by clear and convincing evidence, rather than a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, for an involuntary civil commitment, a unanimous
Court observed in Addington v. Texas 20 that the preponderance of the evidence stan-
dard requires the litigants to "share the risk of error in roughly equal fasion. ' '2 1
Last year, in Santosky v. Kramer, 22 the Court held a preponderance of the evidence
standard violative of due process when applied to terminate parental rights on the
basis of a finding of permanent neglect. Although the Court divided sharply over
the result in the case, 23 all the Justices seemed to agree that "in any given pro-
ceeding, the . . . standard of proof. . . reflects not only the weight of the private
and the public interests affected, but also a societal judgment about how the risk of
error should be distributed between the litigants."'24
B. The Decision Theoretic Formulas
As many commentators have noted,25 the notion that the burden of persuasion
turns on the relative magnitude of the costs of errors can be recast in the language
of decision theory. This translation does more than substitute the bland but
exacting terminology of statisticians or similar analysts for the rhetorical flourishes
of judicial opinions. It provides a method for arriving at quantitative interpreta-
tions of the burdens of persuasion. These quantitative interpretations, which have
figured in a few lower court opinions, 26 are in turn important in appreciating why
one cannot identify a unique level of "statistical significance" that would corre-
spond to proof satisfying the burden of persuasion appropriate to a given type of
case.
A hypothetical, and admittedly contrived, case may help to illustrate the
formal, mathematical approach. A gambler represents that certain dice have a 50-
50 chance of showing an even or an odd number. He entices the person sitting
next to him on a long train trip to play a game in which they alternate rolling the
dice and predicting whether the outcome will be an even or odd. The fellow pas-
senger quits after losing thousands of dollars on the sequence,
19. Id at 371-72 (footnotes omitted).
20. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
21. Id at 423.
22. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
23. The dissenting Justices quoted at length from the concurring opinion in Winshp, but they argued
that, because "the interests at stake are of roughly equal societal importance," a state could adopt the
preponderance of the evidence standard without depriving the natural parents of due process. Id at 787.
24. Id. at 755.
25. See Brook, Inevitable Errors.- The Preponderance of the Evidence Standard in Civil Litigation, 18 TU.SA L.J.
79 (1982); Kaplan, Decision Theoiy and the Factfnding Process, 20 STAN. L. REv'. 1065 (1968); Kaye, The Linits
of the Preponderance of the Evidence Standard- Justifably Naked Statistical Evidence and Multiple Causation., 1982 AM.
B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 487; Lempert,supra note 12; Milanich, Decision Theory and Standards of Proof 5 LAW
& HUMAN BEt.',v,. 87 (1981).
26. Eg., Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d I (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976): United
States v. Fatico, 458 F. Supp. 388 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
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(O,E,O,O,O,O,O,O,O,E). Later, the disgruntled traveller learns that the gambler
always carries two sets of dice. One set, the "null dice," are fair, which is to say
that they have a probability of 0.5 of producing an odd sum on each toss. The
"alternative dice" are loaded so that they have a probability of 0.8 of producing an
odd sum each time. The enraged traveller brings an action for deceit. The dice
are not available for testing because they have been lost in a fire that destroyed the
gambler's home.
Should the jury conclude that the dice were loaded? Considering this question
from the perspective of decision theory, the first proposition, clearly accepted by
the courts, 27 is that to decide the case is to run a risk of deciding it wrongly. In
particular, the jury can make two distinct decisions producing the two types of
errors that Justice Harlan described. One possible decision (D,) is to conclude that
the dice were the "alternative dice" and return a verdict for plaintiff. The other
possibility (D.) is to accept the "null hypothesis" and return a verdict for the
defendant. But the jury cannot be certain where the truth lies. If the "null
hypothesis" is correct but the jury chooses D1, it registers a false alarm, also called
a Type I, or false positive error. If this "Case of the Crooked Gambler" were a
criminal proceeding, one could call this decision a false conviction. On the other
hand, if the dice were the "alternative dice" and the jury chooses D., it misses the
signal and makes a Type II or false negative error. In the criminal context, one
could call this a false acquittal. Using H. as an abbreviation for the hypothesis
that the dice are the null dice (the "null hypothesis") and H, for the alternative
hypothesis, figure 1 summarizes these possibilities.
FIGURE 1
POSSIBLE DECISIONS AND ERRORS
Dt: Reject H.
DECISION Find for Plaintiff
BASED ON
EVIDENCE D.: Accept H.
Find for Defendent
H, true H, true
False Alarm Correct Verdict
Correct Verdict Miss
Evaluating all the evidence in the case, the jury makes some rough estimate of
the probability that the dice were the alternative dice and the probability that
they were the null dice. These probabilities are Pr(HllEvidence) and
Pr(HolEvidence). The "Evidence" in these expressions indicates that these are
probabilities conditioned on all the evidence in the case. One need not worry
about how the jurors evaluate the evidence to arrive at an estimate of these
27. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring):
[In a judicial proceeding in which there is a dispute about the facts of some earlier event, the
factfinder cannot acquire unassailably accurate knowledge of what happened. Instead, all the
factfinder can acquire is a belief of what probabl, happened. The intensity of this belief- the degree
to which a factfinder is convinced that a given act actually occurred - can, of course, vary. In this
regard, a standard of proof represents an attempt to instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of
confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular
type of adjudication.
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probabilities. Although in a real trial the probabilities may never be articulated in
quantitative form, one can characterize the end result of this weighing of the evi-
dence by an assertion about the probability or odds in favor of H. This
probability is called a "posterior probability" because it is formed after all the
evidence is considered.
Once the posterior probability is available, decision theory dictates the verdict
that should be reached-if one can specify the costs of each type of error. Suppose,
following what Justice Blackmun once characterized as "perhaps not an unreason-
able assumption ' 2 for criminal cases, one says that the consequence of an incor-
rect decision for defendant (a false alarm, or false conviction) is ten times as serious
as the consequence of an incorrect decision for plaintiff (a miss, or false acquittal).
The rule that should follow for choosing between D, (a decision for plaintiff's
hypothesis) and D. (a decision for defendant's hypothesis) that minimizes the
expected loss 29 is this: decide for plaintiff (D,) if Pr(H lEvidence) exceeds
1OPr(HolEvidence); otherwise, decide for defendant (D.). Thus, the decision theo-
retic solution is to take action D, if the posterior odds in favor of H, are better
than ten to one. Expressed as a posterior probability, the standard is
Pr(Hl Evidence) > 10/11 = 0.91.
As this example indicates, if the degree of subjective certainty that the law
insists upon can be construed as a probability, 30 the burden of persuasion can be
understood in quantitative terms as a function of the costs of each type of error.
Obviously, there is no single number that could be used to give the relative costs of
the two types of error in a criminal case, 31 and the fact that this mathematical
structure can be used to explore the effect of different weightings on the numerical
expression of the burden of persuasion does not imply that it would be advisable to
instruct jurors in numerical terms.32
Fortunately, the hypothetical posed here involves a civil case, and it seems
plausible to adopt Justice Harlan's suggestion that in the typical civil case where
the preponderance of the evidence standard applies, the law treats a mistaken ver-
28. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 234 (separate opinion).
29. The expected loss under a particular decision rule is (1) the cost of a false alarm weighted by the
probability of a false alarm plus (2) the cost of a miss weighted by the probability of a miss. If many cases
were decided according to the same decision rule, the mean costs of the errors would approach this
expected loss.
30. The validity of this transformation is not uniformly accepted. See Brilmayer & Kornhauser,
Review.- Quantitative Methods and Legal Decisions, 46 U. CHI. L. REx'. 116 (1978); Callen, Notes on a Grand
Illusion. Some Limits on the Use of Bayesian Theory in Evidence Law, 57 IND. L.J. 1 (1982); Cohen, Subjective
Probabiliy and the Paradox of the Gatecrasher, 1981 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 627. The conceptual value of the subjective
interpretation of probability is defended in Kaye, Paradoxes, Gedanken Experiments and the Burden of Proof- A
Response to Dr. Cohen's Reply, 1981 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 635; Kaye, The Laws of Probabi/iy and the Law of/he Land, 47
U. CHI. L. REV. 34 (1979).
31. Hale thought that five guilty men should be acquitted before one innocent man was convicted. 2
M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 288 (W. Stokes & E. Ingersoll ed. 1847). Blackstone thought the ratio
should be ten to one. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 358. Fortescue thought that in capital cases the
ratio should be 20 to one. J. FORTESCUE, COMMENDATION OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 45 (F. Grignor
transl. 1917). See generally Fletcher, Two Kinds of Legal Ru/es: A Comparative Study of Burden of Persuasion
Practices in Criminal Cases, 77 YALE L.J. 880 (1968); Kaplan, supra note 25, at 1077.
32. See Tribe, supra note 10. But see Nagel, Bringing the Values ofJurors in Line with the Law, 63 JUDICA-
TURE 189 (1979) (advocating quantification in instructions).
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dict for the plaintiff as neither better nor worse than a mistaken verdict for the
defendant. 33 The decision rule which then minimizes the expected costs of mis-
taken verdicts is to find for plaintiff whenever the posterior odds exceed one, that
is, whenever Pr (HllEvidence) > 0.5.34 Under this rule, the judge or jury should
proceed on the assumption that the more probable of the two hypotheses is true.
In sum, the decision theoretic interpretation of the applicable legal burden of
persuasion is that the stringency of the requirement in different sorts of cases
reflects in a rough way the relative costs of false alarms and misses, and that the
standards prescribe how the finder of fact Should react to the posterior odds. The
next step is to see how the standards for establishing facts in scientific inquiry fit
into this framework.
III
THE SCIENTIFIC STANDARDS OF PROOF
As observed at the outset of this article, there is an understandable tendency on
the part of litigants and judges to demand that quantitative scientific evidence
meet some unambiguous test for acceptance in the scientific community. The
Supreme Court speaks of statistical tests that would make an hypothesis "suspect"
to a social scientist, 35 and the lower courts respond by requiring "an objective
process known as hypothesis testing. "36
At the same time, the more sophisticated courts realize that these statistical
standards are relatively stringent and often more demanding than the pertinent
legal values would dictate. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,
sitting en banc in Ethyl Corporation v. EPA, 37 expressed this point of view. In
upholding the Environmental Protection Agency's determination, based on "con-
flicting and inconclusive ' 38  scientific evidence, that lead emissions from
automobiles presented a significant risk to the health of urban populations, the
majority rejected the industry's claim that the agency had to rely on a chain of
"scientific facts for evidence that reputable scientific techniques certify as cer-
tain." 39 In doing so, the Ethyl court offered an interpretation of the legal burdens
of persuasion along the lines described above; however, the court's glancing look at
the process for the acceptance of claims in science was less perceptive:
Typically, a scientist will not so certify evidence unless the probability of error, by standard
statistical measurement, is less than 5%. That is, scientific fact is at least 95% certain.
Such certainty has never characterized the judicial or the administrative process. It
may be that the 'beyond a reasonable doubt' standard of criminal law demands 95%
33. See supra text accompanying note 19. Not all commentators accept this premise. See, e.g., Orloff&
Steadman, A Framework for Evaluating the Preponderance-of-the-Evidence Standard, U. PA. L. REv.(1983); Tyree,
Proof and Probabiliy in the Anglo-American Legal System, 23 JURIMETRICS J. 89 (1982).
34. See Kaye, Book Review, 89 YALE L.J. 601 (1980) (reviewing M. FINKEL-STEIN, QUANTITATIVE
METHODS IN LAW: STUDIES IN THE APPLICATION OF MATHEMATICAL PROBABILITY AND STATISTIcs TO
LEGAL PROBLEMS (1978)).
35. See supra text accompanying note 4.
36. Moultrie v. Martin, 690 F.2d 1078, 1082 (4th Cir. 1982).
37. 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976).
38. Id at 26.
39. Id at 28 n.58.
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certainty. . . . But the standard of ordinary civil litigation, a preponderance of the evi-
dence, demands only 51% certainty ...
The standard before administrative agencies is no less flexible. Agencies are not limited
to scientific fact, to 95% certainties. Rather, they have at least the same factfinding powers
as a jury, particularly when, as here, they are engaged in rule making. . . . We must deal
with the terminology of law, not science.
4 °
The Court of Appeals was on the right track. When scientific studies are relevant,
a court or agency must examine the scientific findings with the instruments of legal
factfinding. The court's assumption, however, that when the "probability of [sta-
tistical] error is less than 5%," the "scientific fact is at least 95% certain" exempli-
fies a common misunderstanding of the role of statistical tests in scientific
inference. 4 1 To expose this mistake and to elucidate the precise connection
between statistical error and satisfying a burden of persuasion, whether it be a
requirement of 95% or merely 51% "certainty," an elementary understanding of
the mathematical procedure known as hypothesis testing4 2 is called for.
The Case of the Crooked Gambler provides an illustration of this procedure.
Disregarding some important subtleties, suppose that the experimental results will
not be regarded as convincing evidence of the alternative dice unless the
probability of obtaining these results by rolling the null dice is no larger than five
percent. This requirement is more or less equivalent to insisting on a discrepancy
of at least two standard deviations in a case like Caslaneda. 43 If this is the stan-
dard-and it sounds scientific enough-a court cannot conclude that the dice are
the alternative ones. The probability of the null dice's producing at least eight out
of ten odd outcomes is Pr(EvidencelHo) = 0.055, which is slightly more than
5%. In other words, the experimental results are not "statistically significant" at
the .05 level. The chances are greater than one in twenty that the dice would
exhibit such aberrant behavior even if the dice were exquisitely balanced. Thus,
the null hypothesis cannot be rejected with "scientific certainty."
Even if this procedure seems reasonable-and it is not without powerful critics
in the world of science44-does the finding that the significance probability was
just over 5% establish that one should be just shy of 95% certain that the dice were
indeed the null dice? If it does, then the hypothesis test outlined above would be
40. Id
41. For other opinions advancing substantially the same erroneous interpretation of statistical signifi-
cance, see, e.g., Moultrie v. Martin, 690 F.2d 1078, 1083 n.7 (4th Cir. 1982); National Lime Ass'n v. EPA,
627 F.2d 416, 453 (D.C. Cir. 1980); United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906, 915 (5th Cir. 1973).
That courts may misconstrue the meanings of "significance" and "confidence" is not surprising. Authors of
textbooks and journal articles do the same. See, e.g., D. BARNES, STATISTICS AS PROOF: FUNDAMENTALS
OF QUANTITATIVE EVIDENCE 162 (1983); Braun, Statistics and the Law: Hypothesis Testing and Its Application
to Title VII Cases, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 59, 87 (1980).
42. The concern here is with what are technically known as Neyman-Pearson test procedures. Other
inferential techniques are sometimes loosely referred to as hypothesis or significance tests. See V. BARNETT,
COMPARATIVE STATISTICAL INFERENCE (2d ed. 1982).
43. See, e.g., Kaye, Book Review, supra note 6. The courts are beginning to appreciate the connection
between the significance level (the 5% figure) and the test statistic (the number of standard deviations). See,
e.g., EEOC v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 698 F.2d 633, 654 (4th Cir. 1983). Unfortunately, the
Castaneda and Hazelwood opinions did not make the point with any semblance of clarity. See Kaye,
Rejoinder, 77 J. AM. STATISTICAL A. 790 (1982).
44. See, e.g., THE SIGNIFICANCE TEST CONTROVERSY: A READER (D. Morrison & R. Henkel eds.
1970).
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tantamount to asking for something like proof beyond a reasonable doubt, as the
Ethyl Corporation court seemed to think. In the language of part I, the hypothesis
test would amount to a decision criterion requiring D1 whenever the posterior
probability Pr(HllEvidence) exceeded 0.95.
The difficulty is that this interpretation of the result of the hypothesis test is
wrong. The test was structured so as to retain the null hypothesis unless the
chance of getting the evidence under this hypothesis fell below 5%. The test
focused exclusively on the probability of the evidence given the null hypothesis.
Nothing was said about the probability of the hypothesis in the light of the experi-
mental evidence. It may be tempting to call the probability of 0.055 the chance of
a coincidence, and to say that the probability of something other than a coinci-
dence-of foul play-must be what is left over, namely 0.945. But this only shows
that one can "prove" anything with words. The more precise mathematical nota-
tion makes it plain that the burden of persuasion refers to one probability-
Pr(Alternative hypothesis:Evidence)-while the hypothesis test looks to another-
Pr(Evidence:Null hypothesis). There is a well-defined mathematical relationship
between these two probabilities, but it is not the simple one that linguistic analysis
suggests.45
Intuitively, this distinction is not difficult to appreciate. Why, after all, should
someone be about 95% confident that the gambler used the alternative dice just
because the chance that the null dice would give at least eight out of ten odd
numbers is about 5%? The hypothetical did not even consider the probability that
so many odd numbers would appear if the alternative dice had been involved.
This probability is Pr(EvidencelH,) = 0.678. These two probabilities, 0.055 for
the evidence given the null hypothesis and 0.678 for the evidence given the alter-
native hypothesis, summarize all the information that can be found in the statis-
tical data. The probabilities do not change if, instead of a "Crooked Gambler," the
person who had proposed the game and won the money was an honest law pro-
fessor who had inherited the two sets of dice from his distant cousin, the crooked
gambler, but who, having no idea of the latter's dishonest inclinations, selected one
of the two sets of dice at random.
In short, if both the null and alternative hypotheses were equally likely at the
outset, as they presumably would be in the case of the Honest Law Professor, one
could reasonably conclude from the statistical evidence that the probability in
favor of the alternative dice really is in the vicinity of 0.95. But the assumption
that the gambler is just as likely to pull out the alternative dice as the null dice has
no evidentiary foundation. His behavior would seem to depend on such factors as
his avarice and his perception of the gullibility of the plaintiff. Although such
matters, which might be summed up in a statement about the "prior probability"
that the gambler would use the null dice, surely bear on the probability that the
gambler used the alternative dice to part the plaintiff from his money, they are
outside the scope of the hypothesis test. That test looks solely to Pr(EvidencelNull
hypothesis). The test ignores the two other vital ingredients, the probability of the
45. For the precise relationship, see, e.g., M. DEGROOT, PROBABILITY AND STATISTICS 373-82 (1975).
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evidence given the alternative hypothesis and the prior probability of the hypoth-
esis itself.4 6
For these reasons, the results of hypothesis tests do not dictate "legal signifi-
cance." They do not even determine the degree of certainty that a scientific
hypothesis enjoys. The significance probability Pr(Evidence Null hypothesis) used
in statistical tests, whether stated explicitly or measured indirectly with a statistic
like the standard deviation, is but part of the equation. It does not necessarily
mean that the posterior odds exceed the threshold implicit in the pertinent burden
of persuasion. The finder of fact also needs to know the prior probability and the
probability of the evidence under the alternative hypothesis. 47 Expert testimony
sometimes can quantify the latter probability, but the former is outside the range
of statistical expertise.
48
IV
CONCLUSION
Statistically significant results are nice to have. Scientists like them, and now
litigants who rely on statistical evidence also want them. But the mere fact that an
expert states that data are "significant" does not necessarily mean that the evi-
dence satisfies the applicable burden of persuasion. Nor does the fact that a scien-
tist cannot certify data as "significant" imply that the evidence inevitably falls
short of what the law requires. The process of judgment, in law as well as in
science, is much richer than the recipes for statistical hypothesis tests reveal.
46. One commentator, recognizing that the 0.05 significance level often is more demanding than the
preponderance of the evidence standard, proposes structuring hypothesis tests to equate the risks of false
alarms and misses. Dawson, Are Statisti cans Being Fair to Di crtminaton Plaintifs?, 21 JURIMETRICS J. 1
(1980). This procedure, however, does not conform to the preponderance of the evidence standard either,
unless the prior odds happen to be 50-50.
47. Because, roughly speaking, only one of the three pertinent variables is known from the significance
probability Pr(Evidence I Null hypothesis), a small value for this variable (that is, a "highly significant"
result), does not guarantee a large value for the posterior probability Pr(Alternative hypothesis I Evidence).
For an example drawn from science, see Kaye, Book Review, 32 J. LEGAL EDuc. 145, 149 (1982)
(reviewing P. SHUCHMAN, PROBLEMS OF KNOWLEDGE IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP (1979)). Inversely, a large
significance probability (a "very insignificant result") need not imply a small posterior probability. For
instance, if only six of ten rolls of the dice had produced odd numbers in the Crooked Gambler case, the
probability of such evidence under the null hypothesis would be 0.377, which is "not significant." Yet, the
probability under the alternative hypothesis is also much higher, specifically 0.967, so that if the prior odds
were more or less equal, the statistical evidence would favor the alternative hypothesis.
48. See Aickin & Kaye, Some Mathematical and Legal Considerations in Using Serological Tests to Prove Pater-
nity, in INCLUSION PROBABILITIES IN PARENTAGE TESTING (R. Walker ed. 1983); Ellman & Kaye,
Probabilities and Proof Can HLA and Blood Group Testing Prove Paternity, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1131 (1979).
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